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INTRODUCTION
"I thought as long as you got the title your home belongs to you for life."' For
most of American history and in most instances, Ann Giannini would have been
correct. But unfortunately for Mrs. Giannini, her home was no longer protected by
a rigid "public use" requirement. Because the City of Detroit believed it could find
a more economically beneficial use for the land her house occupied, the City seized
and demolished her home.
The Founders, when drafting the United States Constitution, protected private
property from confiscation by the federal government through the Fifth Amendment
requirement that no "private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."2 The constitutions of forty-seven states, including Michigan, have similarly
encapsulated this protection by using the same "public use" language.' But during
the course of the twentieth century, American courts and the Michigan Supreme
Court, specifically in its Poletown decision, expanded the definition of "public use"
in new and broadening ways - ways which made Mrs. Giannini incorrect.
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court found a new "public use" when it decided
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.4 Poletown employed a new
theory of "public use" - one that rested on the general economic benefit that may
result to the community from the taking.5 The Poletown court ruled that the
Michigan Constitution at article 10, section 26 permitted as a "public use" the
transfer of private property to a different private owner "to promote industry and
commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the municipality
and state."7
In reaching its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court found that "[t]he term
'public use' has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by this Court in prior
cases."' The economic benefit rationale used in Poletown had been growing in
prominence across the nation. Through its prominence, Poletown pushed forward
William Serrin, Detroiters Confronting a Choice: New Jobs or Old Neighborhoods,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1980, at Al (quoting Poletown resident Ann Giannini, after her home
was taken to provide space for a new General Motors assembly plant).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:
A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use," 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 569,
595-97 n. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective].
4 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
Id. at 459-60.
6 MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (amended 1963) ("Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner
prescribed by law.").
7 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
8 id.
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the nationwide acceptance of the economic benefit rationale. Poletown, though
heavily criticized at the time it was decided, began to be taught in law school texts
as an acceptable justification for public takings.9 Local governments quickly
learned this lesson and used it to expand their eminent domain power to new
limits. I0
But, as Mrs. Giannini believed, it was not always this way; neither would
it remain so in Michigan. In July 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court returned
Michigan's eminent domain law to its pre-Poletown status. In County of Wayne v.
Hathcock," the Michigan Supreme Court faced a set of facts similar to those
presented in Poletown. 2 This time the court overruled its prior decision and found
that its earlier holding did not apply in Hathcock:
Because Poletown's conception of a public use - that of
"alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base
of the community" - has no support in the Court's eminent
domain jurisprudence before the Constitution's 'atification, its
interpretation of "public use" in art. 10, § 2 cannot reflect the
common understanding of that phrase among those sophisticated
in the law at ratification. 13
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized its error and overturned "Poletown's
'economic benefit' rationale,"' 4 thereby restoring Michigan's original "public use"
requirement for legitimate government takings and quieting the clang that Justice
Ryan had predicted in his Poletown dissent. 5 Hathcock sounded a clear bell that
9 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1108-12 (5th ed. 2002).
'0 Dana Berliner, Home, Safe Home, 13 LIBERTY & LAW (Oct. 2004), available at http://
www.ij.org/publications/liberty/2004/13_5_04a.html.
" 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
12 Poletown was the result of Detroit's attempt to use its eminent domain power to
condemn an entire neighborhood and allow General Motors to build an assembly plant on
the newly condemned land. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. The Supreme Court of Michigan
ruled that, under the Michigan constitution's "public use language, the city's goal of increas-
ing employment and expanding the tax base to provide a general economic benefit to the
larger community were proper grounds for allowing the condemnation and transfer to a
private entity to occur. Id. at 459-60.
"3 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787 (citation omitted).
14 Id. at 786.
15 Justice Ryan warned:
The reverberating clang of [Poletown's] economic, sociological,
political, and jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard and felt for
generations. By its decision, the Court has altered the law of eminent
domain in this state in a most significant way and, in my view, seriously
jeopardized the security of all private property ownership.
2005]
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"a private entity's pursuit of profit"'6 is not a public use and that the government
should not be in the business of redistributing land among private owners.
Not more than a year after Hathcock was decided in Michigan, the United
States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that a mistaken Michigan
Supreme Court had reached in 198 I's Poletown decision. 7 By ignoring the text of
the Constitution and relying on Connecticut's good intentions, the United States
Supreme Court read the "public use" requirement in the most permissive terms
possible 8 and validated the taking of private land for an economic benefit."
To better understand why the Michigan Supreme Court was correct and the
United States Supreme Court was in error, this Note examines the Founders'
understanding of individual property rights in order to understand the "public use"
requirement for infringing upon property rights, as used in the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and as included in the constitutions of the several
states, specifically Michigan's. Part I examines the influence that John Locke had
upon the Founders' understanding of property rights and how they installed their
understanding of natural rights in their new government. This Part pays particular
attention to the new government's chief end of protecting the right to property. Part
II considers more explicitly the original meaning of "public use" as a literal
requirement, which acted as a bar on the power of eminent domain. Parts Il and
IV of this Note examine the slippery slope away from the Founders' original
understanding of "public use" and its confusion with a "public benefit rationale"
that occurred most notably during the twentieth century, concentrating on the
Poletown case in Michigan. Part V concludes that the 2004 Hathcock decision,
which overturned Poletown, was a correct interpretation of the original understand-
ing of "public use" in Michigan, which understanding stemmed from the original
understanding of the term in the Fifth Amendment. Part VI surveys the national
landscape of "public use" jurisprudence and pays considerable attention to the
recently decided Kelo case. This Note concludes that Kelo makes Hathcock all the
more important because it provides other states with a model to follow in
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
16 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786.
'7 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
IS See id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is simply the latest in a
string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the
slightest nod to its original meaning."). As Justice O'Connor explained,
[t]o reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits re-
sulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render
economic development takings "for public use" is to wash out any
distinction between private and public use of property - and thereby
effectively to delete the words "for public use" from the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 2668 (majority opinion).
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interpreting their own constitutions, which the Kelo majority invited state courts to
do.
I. THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. The Right to Property Is a Natural Right
Property, and specifically land, is one of the most intimate holdings human
beings possess. Taking an owner's property against his will incites passions to a
degree reached by few other events.2" Ann Giannini understood this principle
before her house was destroyed. Ann's belief that the government should protect
her property, and not take it capriciously, was a belief rooted in the foundation of
the United States.
The Founders' high regard for property rights was informed by the natural
rights philosophers and political theorists they studied. Most prominently the
Founders were familiar with John Locke, who observed an intimate connection
between a man's life, liberty, and property.2 Locke believed that governments were
formed to protect the natural rights of man and that among man's natural rights was
a right to property.22 Locke reasoned that property could be acquired only through
the use of a man's life and liberty, in the form of his labor, and for this reason he
perceived the three as blending together.23
Locke believed that man has ownership of himself and therefore ownership of
his labor and the fruit of his labor - his property.24
[E]very man has aproperty in his ownperson: this no body has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work
of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that
20 Machiavelli bluntly recognized this principle:
The prince should nonetheless make himself feared in such a mode
that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred, because being feared
and not being hated can go together very well. This he will always do
if he abstains from the property of his citizens and his subjects .... But
above all, he must abstain from the property of others, because men
forget the death of a father more quickly than the loss of a patrimony.
NIccoI MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 67 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1985) (1532).
21 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 19, at 15 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE].
22 Id. §§ 26-30, at 18-20.
23 id.
24 See id.
20051
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is his own, and thereby makes it his property .... [I]t hath by
this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common
right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to .... "
Locke's philosophy was the most influential of the many natural rights theories
the Founders studied.26 "By the late eighteenth century, 'Lockean' ideas of govern-
ment and revolution were accepted everywhere in America; they seemed, in fact,
a statement of principles built into English constitutional tradition."" It is this
Lockean, natural rights understanding of property and just government that is the
key to unlocking a proper understanding of how and why the Founders intended to
secure private property rights.
Because obtaining property requires the mixing of an individual's labor with the
property to make it wholly his own, it becomes a part of his life - life having been
exchanged to make it so. Therefore, if an individual is free to labor, and the product
of his labor naturally becomes his property, then it is clear that his life, liberty, and
property are bound together and are, at one level, indistinguishable. The taking of
his property is, then, the taking of his life and his liberty.2"
The Founders regarded liberty and property to be inseparable.29 Thomas
Jefferson wrote of their unity, "The God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same
time; the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them."3
B. Government Should Protect Private Property
From their understanding of Locke, the Framers understood that government's
first purpose was to protect the natural rights of its citizens: their life, liberty, and
property.3' Following Locke, the Framers believed that government must secure its
25 Id. § 27, at 19 (emphasis in original).
26 See Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 576.
27 Steven J. Eagle, The Development ofProperty Rights in America andthe PropertyRights
Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 82 (2002) [hereinafter Eagle, The Development of
Property Rights] (quoting PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE 87 (1997)).
28 This is why the American public knew instantaneously in their bones that Kelo was an
affront to their rights and to what they rightly believed to be a large part of the essence of the
United States - protection of private property.
29 THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND JUSTICE IN
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 37 (1997).
30 Id. (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Summary View of the Rights of British America,
in WRITINGS 122 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984) (1774) (first emphasis
added)).
31 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
356 [Vol. 14:351
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citizens in the free exercise of their rights to property and to protect the property
they acquired.32 The Framers believed that government, by securing citizens in their
natural rights and formalizing their duties to one another, would permit the citizenry
to pursue the "higher goods in life."33
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness -
That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed ....
Id. See James Madison, Property (1792), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 598
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) [hereinafter Madison, Property]
("Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the
various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end
of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own.") (emphasis in original); see also infra notes 45,46,48 and accompanying
text.
32 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
" Eric R. Claeys, Property, Morality, and Society In Founding Era Legal Treatises 27,
Address Before the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 30,2002).
Notably Claeys here establishes "property" as the basis of securing a happy and good life,
or to use a more famous phrase "to pursue happiness." The quote here cited continues with
a longer explanation of the role of property rights in encouraging individuals to morality and
good, happy lives:
This right to property was certainly "absolute" in the sense that it was
inalienable. But it was not "absolute" in the sense that every person was
entitled to use his own regardless of the consequences to himself or his
neighbors, or in the sense that comfortable enjoyment of property was
the summum bonum of Founding Era morality.
To the contrary, in the treatise writers' thought, reason and the
conscience can discern a series of principled limitations on the scope
of property rights. These limitations lay the basis for moral duties on
the use of property. Each of the duties follows from an analysis of how
property contributes to human happiness in comparison with other
sources of human happiness. Property is qualified from beneath in
relation to goods that are lower but more necessary. Because health and
safety problems threaten self-preservation more urgently than the lack
of property, each person's property rights must be subordinated to
respect his neighbor's personal rights to health and safety. Property is
also qualified by the equal property rights of neighbors. Because each
individuals' rights to provide for her self-preservation and prosperity
are equal in principle with every neighbor's, every person owes a duty
to use her own property in ways that leave neighbors with equal
freedom of action to put their own property to constructive uses.
Finally, property is qualified from above by the high and refined.
Because human life cannot be fulfilling without society or political life,
each person's property rights must be qualified to make sure no one
uses his property in a manner that threatens to disturb the moral
2005]
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From their understanding of Locke, the Framers understood that government
justly derives its powers from the consent of the governed, who have entered the
social compact to protect their natural rights. Therefore, government action that
contravenes the people's natural rights is unjust. Richard Epstein, like Locke, has
observed that "[t]he state arises because the rates of error and abuse in pure self-
help regimes become intolerable. The strength of a natural law theory [of property
rights] is in its insistence that individual rights (and their correlative obligations)
exist independent of agreement and prior to the formation of the state."34 Because
individuals outside the social compact, that is to say individuals in a state of nature,
do not have the right to possess another's property without the other's consent, the
government which they form to better protect their right to property cannot justly
be given that right.35 It is imperative for a government which receives its just
powers from the consent of the governed to protect private property interests. The
only instance in which an individual could rightfully take another's property
without his or her consent would be in the face of an emergency.36 So too the
government must be limited in its use of its eminent domain power to cases in
which there is an exigency requiring the taking for a "public use."
One of the first Supreme Court Justices, William Patterson, offered a fine
summary of the interconnection of the Lockean view of private property and just
government in his charge to the jury in the early Pennsylvania case Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance:
37
[I]t is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent,
and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property:
Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to
their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the
objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would
conditions that make social life and self-government possible.
Id. at 27-28.
34 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAiN 334 (1985). Cf. LOCKE, supra note 21, §§ 25-5 1, at 18-30.
35 See 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES § 256 (3d ed. 1909) [hereinafter LEWIS]; Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective,
supra note 3, at 584.
36 This is little more than a precursor of the Property doctrine of safe harbor, by which
individuals may enter upon another's land in an emergency but are responsible for any
property destruction their actions create. Because Lockean theory posits that government has
no more power or rights than the individuals who have created it could have in nature, the
government's ability to take property may be thought of as a corollary to the safe harbor rule.
Thus, a taking may occur in the face of necessity - for a public use - but the government
must provide just compensation for the property it takes.
" 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
[Vol. 14:351
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become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy
the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation of
property then is a primary object of the social compact...."
Jefferson iterated this sentiment in his First Inaugural Address when he
observed that to protect private property, "a wise and frugal Government... shall
restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate
their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth
of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government... ."" The
Founders recognized that if the government they were creating was to protect
individual liberty, it would necessarily protect the individual's natural right to
property.
James Madison, writing as Publius, famously declared protection of the ability
to acquire and maintain property as the first aim of government: "The diversity in
the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties
is the first object of Government. '
In 1792, Madison lauded the protection of property as one of the new nation's
chief concerns:
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise
due to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the
rights of property, and the property in rights: they will rival the
government that most sacredly guards the former; and by
repelling its example in violating the latter, will make them-
selves a pattern to that and all other governments.4
John Adams captured the sentiment more succinctly: "Property must be secured or
liberty cannot exist."'42
The most popular formulation comes to us from Thomas Jefferson's pen in the
Declaration of Independence's statement that "all Men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness43 - That to secure these Rights,
38 Id.
3' Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/jefinaul.htm.
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 41 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2002).
41 Madison, Property, supra note 31, at 599.
42 Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27, at 83 (quoting 6 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850)).
41 See Claeys, supra note 33, at 3-4 (explaining Jefferson's substitution of "pursuit of
happiness" for "property").
2005]
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Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed...
With such strong beliefs as to liberty's protection being so closely connected
with the protection of property, it is no surprise that the Founders encoded the
protection of property in their state and federal constitutions. George Mason wrote
in Virginia's Bill of Rights, approved June 12, 1776:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into
a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.45
John Adams, Samuel Adams, and James Bowdoin used very similar language in
drafting Massachusetts' Constitution:
All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.'
And again at Article X: "Each individual of the society has a right to be protected
by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws."' 7
These two most prominent state constitutions reflect protections included by several
other early states.48
When the Founders claimed that every American enjoyed an inalien-
able right to pursue happiness, they did not mean by "happiness" self-
gratification or egoism. The pursuit of happiness meant the pursuit of
all of the sources of a good life - self-regarding, social, political, and
intellectual - each in proportion to how much it contributes to the
completely happy life as discerned by reason.
As has been discussed above, the "pursuit of happiness" cannot occur if one is concerned
each day with the preservation of his property.
44 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
41 VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1 (emphasis added).
46 MASS. CONST. art. I, repealed by MASS. CONST. amend. art. CVI (emphasis added).
47 Id. at art. X.
48 See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, § I ("[A]ll men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety."); MD. CONST. of 1776, § XXI ("That no freeman ought to
[Vol. 14:351
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The Founders encoded their Lockean understanding of property rights in the
new nation's laws and made protecting property chief among their government's
purposes because they understood such protection to be their inheritance as a
natural right, which government should protect.49
II. THE FOUNDERS REQUIRED A TAKING TO BE FOR A "PUBLIC USE"
A. The Presence of a "Public Use" Requirement
Though the Founders believed the protection of private property to be the
chief end of government,5" they recognized that government should have the power
to take private property when it was necessary for it to act for a "public use."'"
be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but bX the
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XII ("That no
freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land."); S.C. CONST. of 1778, § XLI ("That no freeman of this
State be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or
outlawed, exiled or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, § I
("THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent
and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety."); id at ch. 1, § II ("That private property ought to be subservient to public uses,
when necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man's property is taken for
the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."); id. at ch. 1, § IX
("[N]o part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses,
without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives . . . ."). The Pennsylvania
Constitution, more explicitly then others, recognized the reciprocal rights and duties of
individuals within its commonwealth:
[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection, and
yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But
no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied to
public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal represen-
tatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing
arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent, nor
are the people bound by any laws, but such as they have in like manner
assented to, for their common good.
PA. CONST. of 1776, § VIII.
" See supra notes 31-32, 35, 38-41, 44-48 and accompanying text.
50 See supra Part I-B.
51 See Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 574, 586. See generally
2005]
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Though distrustful of a powerful government, the Founders placed only the "public
use" and "just compensation" restrictions on the power of eminent domain in the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 2 This apparent paradox can only be resolved
if the Founders intended these restrictions to provide significant restraints on the
government's power, which they did.
The "public use" restriction on eminent domain was present early in the colo-
nies." The Founders were not introducing new, undefined restrictions in the
Takings Clause. These were mechanisms they were familiar with from Locke and
English law and which they understood to be high bars to government action.54 The
1641 version of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties at Section 8 demonstrates the
colonists' early understanding of the "public use" requirement: "No man's cattle or
goods of what kind soever shall be pressed or taken for any public use or service,
unless it be by warrant grounded upon some act of the General Court."" This early
formulation of the requirement clearly required an actual physical use of the "cattle
or goods" for a "public use."
-Though the Founders "rejected the British monarchy and formed new structures
of government, 5 6 they were committed to maintaining the English common law
protection of property rights:
The new Constitution, which established the scope of legitimate
political power and its exercise, was bound by two significant
limitations. The first was respect for contract, both private and
public. The second was tradition, largely embodied in the
common law, which served to identify and enforce personal
rights. "[T]ogether these placed life, liberty, and property morally
beyond the caprice of kings, lords, or popular majorities."57
Protection from government takings appeared elsewhere before the Constitution
in another of the organic laws of the United States - The Northwest Ordinance."
Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" Just compensation was also historically required, but is outside the focus of this Note.
See supra Part I-B; see also Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at
574; Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27, at 83.
11 Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 574.
56 Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27, at 83.
57 Id. (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1790, at 310 (1979)).
" Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. 11 (1787), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:
DOCUMENTING ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND BILL OF RIGHTS 392 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1978).
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The Northwest Ordinance explicitly protected private property rights from govern-
ment takings unless there was a necessary public use:
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; and should the
public exigencies make it necessary for the common preserva-
tion to take any person's property, or to demand his particular
services, full compensation shall be made for the same; and in
the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and
declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the
said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with,
or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and
without fraud previously formed.59
Just as the states had given specific emphasis to preserving private property
rights they gave specific requirements for the government's infringement upon those
rights, the most restrictive being the "public use" requirement.60
The "public use" requirement in Virginia's 1776 Bill of Rights protected those
who could vote from "be[ing] taxed or deprived of their property for public uses,
without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected."
6
'
John Adams wrote the protection into the constitution of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by
it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to
standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his
share to the expense of this protection; to give his personal
service, or an equivalent, when necessary: but no part of the
property of any individual, can, with justice, be taken from him,
or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the
representative body of the people. In fine, the people of this
commonwealth are not controllable by any other laws than those
to which their constitutional representative body have given
their consent. And whenever the public exigencies require that
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public
uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.62
Id. at 395.
o See, e.g., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 VA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended 1971).
62 MASS. CONST. art. X, amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. XXXIX (emphasis
added). Here the connection of the taking power to matters involving "public exigencies"
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While the Founders conceived a government dedicated to the protection of
property rights, they admitted there were proper instances in which government
could interfere with the private right to property. However, they limited the
interference to matters involving a necessary "public use," which seemed natural
to the Founders from their understanding of Locke and English common law.
B. Determining What Constitutes a "Public Use"
The Fifth Amendment sets forth the conditions under which the government
may take private property. The taking must be for a "public use," and the owner
must receive "just compensation" for his taken land.63 To understand just how far
astray "public use" jurisprudence has been carried by cases such as Poletown and
Kelo, one must understand the strictness with which the term was originally applied.
The appropriate place to start the investigation, then, is with an examination of
what the words "public use" meant when the Fifth Amendment was written.
Timothy Sandefur has traced the history of a formally required "public use" to
the coining of the term "eminent domain," by Hugo Grotius.6 Grotius character-
ized eminent domain as allowing "a king... [to] take away [property] from his
subjects.... "65 But Grotius restricted the king's power by attaching a qualifier that
"in order to [take private property] by the power of eminent domain, first, thepublic
welfare must require it, and, second, compensation must be made to the loser, if
possible, from the public funds."66 Not surprisingly, the "public use" requirement
came to the United States from Grotius through the English legal system and its
common law.
English common law focused heavily upon Grotius' particular phrase "the public
welfare must require it.... 67 The common law's respect for property was "'so great
... that it [would] not authorize the least violation [of private property rights] ... no,
not even for the general good of the whole community."'6" Blackstone's strict
statement "seems to require an actual public use, such as a public road."69
further qualifies the conditions under which a public use taking is proper.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" See Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 571.
65 Id. (quoting HuGo GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. 2, ch. XIV, § 7 (L.
Loomis, trans., Walter J. Black 1949)).
SId. (emphasis added).
67 id.
68 Id. at 573 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139) (alterations
added).
69 id.
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The people's representatives must take property only when they have deter-
mined that a genuine public need exists."0 When property is taken capriciously for
purposes that are not specific public uses, the Constitution is contravened.
7
'
It is ... difficult to form a case, in which the necessity of a state
can be of such a nature, as to authorise or excuse the seizing of
landed property belonging to one citizen, and giving it to
another citizen. It is immaterial to the state, in which of its
citizens the land is vested; but it is of primary importance, that,
when vested, it should be secured, and the proprietor protected
in the enjoyment of it. The constitution encircles, and renders
it an holy thing.72
Justice Patterson's statement, shortly after the ratification of the Fifth Amendment,
clearly demonstrates the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment to be that
government could take private lands only for public uses and could not redistribute
one owner's private lands to another private owner for a private use.
Three years later, the Court reinforced Patterson's understanding and stated that
"a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B." would be "contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact" and could not "be considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority. '73 The words "public use" still served as a
meaningful restriction on the government power of eminent domain in 1909 when
John Lewis, the esteemed author of"A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in
the United States," wrote:
The power of eminent domain ... is the power of a sovereign
State to appropriate private property to particular uses for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare. This power was
originally in the people, in their sovereign capacity, and was by
them delegated to the legislature in the general grant of legisla-
tive power. In the absence of any restrictions, the legislature
could take private property for any purpose calculated to
promote the general good. By the provision in question [the
words "public use"], the people said to the legislature, in effect,
70 See supra Part I-B (stating that a Lockean understanding of the derivation of
government's just powers leads to this requirement).
7' Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27, at 94 (summarizing 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1st ed. 1827)).
72 Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (1795).
73 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis in original). This quote
comes from Justice Chase's opinion for the court, but Justice Patterson concurred in the
finding.
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You shall not exercise this power except for public use. To give
these words any effect, they must be construed as limiting the
power to which they relate, that is, as limiting the purposes for
which private property may be appropriated. As the power is by
its nature limited to such purposes as promote the general
welfare, it is evident that the words public use, if they are to be
construed as a limitation, cannot be equivalent to the general
welfare or public good. They must receive a more restricted
definition.74
Lewis's writings reflect a Lockean understanding of government's power, an
understanding that the Founders, such as Madison and Adams, also held.75
The Founders would not have allowed takings for amorphous public uses. To
do so would have been at odds with their understanding of a government receiving
its just powers from the consent of the governed.76 Accordingly, the government
can be given only the power that the people once had held." Sandefur recognizes
the same public choice problem Lewis identified when the "public use" requirement
is read broadly:7"
74 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 256, at 503-04 (citation omitted).
'5 See supra notes 31-32, 35, 38-41, 44-48, 52 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
" Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 584 ("Since people have no
right to steal from each other in the State of Nature, they cannot give government that right,
or justify theft by compact.").
78 See generally Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 651 (2005) [hereinafter Sandefur, A Gleeful
Obituary for Poletown]; Timothy Sandefur, Freedom and the Burden of Proof: Randy E.
Barnett's New Book on the Constitution, 10 INDEP. REv. 139 (2005). In both articles,
Sandefur argues that the root of this "broad reading" problem is contained in Blackstone's
conception of just government and his reliance entirely upon the will of the majority to
establish what is just and to set for itself the parameters of proper government action.
Blackstone's view clashes mightily with Locke's natural rights theory ofjust government. As
discussed previously in Parts II and III-B, according to Locke, government governs justly
only when it governs to the limits of the rights its citizens naturally possess. Once govern-
ment crosses this line, it governs unjustly. Therefore, government is restricted by what is
naturally in the rights of its citizens to do. Sandefur points out that The Federalist argues
strongly for the Lockean conception of government, when in No. 51 it explains that majori-
tarian factions must be mindful of the rights of the minority and are restricted by natural law
from trampling on them. Sandefur traces the ideological tension between Locke and
Blackstone through America's history and argues that Blackstone's interpretation has
ultimately, but incorrectly won out, as evidenced by the ever expanding reach of government
power and the apparent lack of concern with any demarcated boundaries for government's
further growth, other than the will of the majority.
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So, too, if the legislature may take property whenever it serves
a "public interest," and if the legislature itself determines what
constitutes a public interest, then eminent domain becomes a
blank check, rendering the public use clause surplusage. It is a
basic rule of construction that the Constitution should be read to
give effect to all its provisions; however, only this Madisonian
understanding - that the public use clause requires something
more than public convenience - does SO.
79
The Founders did not draft the Fifth Amendment so as to make permissible a
taking for an amorphous general benefit to the community.0 Neither did they
record a positive, concrete formula for determining what constitutes a "public use."
Explaining the meaning of the words "public use" in the Fifth Amendment would
have been superfluous to the Founders because the only reading of "public use" that
gives the words a separate meaning is their plain reading: as a limit on the
legislature's power.8'
Lewis's treatise summarizes and argues for this narrow, plain reading defi-
nition of "public use":
The public use of anything is the employment or application of
the thing by the public. Public use means the same as use by the
public, and this it seems to us is the construction the words
should receive in the constitutional provision in question. The
reasons which incline us to this view are: First, That it accords
with the primary and more commonly understood meaning of
the words; second, it accords with the general practice in regard
to taking private property for public use in vogue when the
phrase was first brought into use in the earlier constitutions;
third, it is the only view which gives the words any force as a
limitation or renders them capable of any definite and practical
application.
If the constitution means that private property can be taken
only for use by the public, it affords a definite guide to both the
legislature and the courts. Though the property is vested in
private individuals or corporations, the public retain certain
definite rights to its use or enjoyment, and to that extent it
remains under the control of the legislature. If no such rights
79 Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 588-89.
80 See supra notes 51, 68-69, 74, 76 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 75, 78 and accompanying text.
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are secured to the public, then the property is not taken for
public use and the act of appropriation is void. 2
Coexistent at the Founding, as has been demonstrated, was a great respect for
private property and an equally great distrust of the degree to which a powerful
government could intrude upon one's property.83 It would therefore be at odds with
the Founders' understanding to allow property to be taken for any tangential "public
use." Had they believed that the legislature could name a "public use" for any
parametric reason, 4 the Founders would have more liberally delineated the
conditions under which the legislature could order a taking. But they did not. They
were comfortable with the severe limitations they placed upon the legislature's
eminent domain power by means of the "public use" and "just compensation"
restraints.
Reconciling the Founders' high regard for private property rights with their
empowerment of the legislature to determine when a "public use" existed demands
that-the "public use" requirement be seen as a high, burdensome, and specific
protection to be invoked on those rare occasions when private lands are necessary
for a physical public use.85 If the requirement is not seen as an actual limitation on
the legislature's power and "the constitution means that private property may be
taken for any purpose of public benefit and utility, [then] what limit is there to the
power of the legislature?"86
I. THE ROAD TO POLETOWN
A. A National Progression
Though the decisions in several late nineteenth century cases loosened the
"public use" limitation on the legislature's power, 7 the unraveling accelerated
during the twentieth century. "[C]ourts had long permitted some leeway in applying
82 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 258, at 506-08 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
83 See supra Part I and Part I-B.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 35, § 258.
86 Id. § 258, at 508.
87 The rise of the railroads during the nineteenth century drove the legislatures of the
several states to sanction taking private property for the construction of "public ways." See
Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown, supra note 78, at 657-58 (discussing the
influence of railroad development on the public use debate in greater depth and quoting
Thomas M. Cooley, who explained that the railroad takings were justified because, "[e]very
government makes provision for the public ways; and for this purpose it may seize and
appropriate lands... [and railroads] are equally public highways with others, when open for
use to the public impartially.").
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the public use requirement, [but] the concept of public use steadily lost meaning
after the 1930s.""8 John Lewis's narrow definition of public use "was rowing
against the tide. In short order the Supreme Court explicitly declined to confine the
concept of public use to situations in which the public could make actual use of the
property taken. Most state courts took a similar path., 8 9 In the early twentieth
century, federal and state cases continually expanded the legislature's power to
claim a "public use" in their act of taking.90
What evolved was a change in language. Federal and state courts came to
conflate "public use" with "public benefit."' The change to this much more per-
missive language was accompanied by a dynamic shift in rationale, which courts
employed to easily approve legislative takings for a wide range of "public benefit"
projects.92
Under the "public benefit" rationale, it is nearly impossible to think of a taking
for which it cannot be claimed a "public benefit" exists. Such an expansion of
power clearly runs against the definition and restraint the Founders had designed
the "public use" requirement to embody. 93 Abandoning the heightened protection
of "public use" for the lower "public benefit" threshold allowed for takings of
property that the Founders never would have allowed. This subtle change in
language inverted the purpose of the "public use" clause. What had previously been
a trusty protection for property owners was changed into an effective and blunt tool
wielded in government takings.
"This trend climaxed in the virtual elimination of the public use requirement in
the 1954 case Berman v. Parker, the 1981 Poletown [sic] case in Michigan, and the
1984 case Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff."94 These cases allowed a legitimate "public
benefit" taking if there was "some connection, however tenuous, to some at least
minimally plausible conception of the public interest."95 Consequently, "[t]o allow
this form of indirect public benefit to satisfy the requirement for a public use is to
make the requirement wholly empty. '"96 The rationale validated by these cases had
88 James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 34 [hereinafter
Ely].
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 See Sandefur, A NaturalRights Perspective, supra note 3, at 594 (observing that with
"the derogation of the natural rights foundation of the public use clause, and growing political
hostility toward powerful corporations and wealthy interests, government redistribution of
property came to be justified in terms of the 'public benefit').
92 id.
13 See supra discussion Part II.
14 See Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 595 (citations omitted).
9' Id. (quoting Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1993)).
96 EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 170.
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the effect, for all practical purposes, of removing the restraints that the "public use"
requirement had imposed.97
By substituting "public benefit" for "public use," several state courts and
legislative bodies improperly widened the range of "public uses" for which private
property could be taken. In doing so they routinely contravened the original
understanding of the "public use" requirement in two ways. First, they incorrectly
declared a community's ostensive general economic benefit, rather than an actual
or tangible one,9" to be a "public use." Second, they took land from one private
owner and gave it to another private owner for a private use.99
B. Michigan's Path
As one of the Northwest Territories, Michigan was governed under the
Northwest Ordinance for the first thirty years of its recognized existence.'0° Upon
the grant of statehood, Michigan approved the first of its four constitutions. The
first Michigan Constitution, ratified in 1835, explicitly included a "public use"
requirement for takings in its Bill of Rights: "The property of no person shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation therefor."'O' This prohibition was
nearly identical to the Fifth Amendment's0 2 and demonstrates that the Michigan
founders intended to protect private property in a manner similar to the nation's
Founders, such as Madison, Jefferson, and Adams.0 3
The language of the "public use" requirement was maintained throughout each
of the three successive Michigan constitutions. In 1850, the exact language was
kept, with the addition of two provisions. The first new provision restricted
corporations from taking land for public use by making such a taking subject to just
compensation and to further prescriptions of law." The second "public use"
provision addressed the opening of roads and made an allowance for takings that
were necessary for the completion of a road, the necessity of which was to be
determined by a jury of other landholders.5
9 The recent Kelo decision has merely done nationally what Poletown did in Michigan
and has simply extended the Supreme Court's "public use" jurisprudence to the next logical
step.
98 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (highlighting the high protection that
the Northwest Ordinance provided for property rights).
"' MICH. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1835).
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103 See supra notes 44, 46-47, 49, 51, 59-60 and accompanying text.
'04 MICH. CONST. art. XV, § 9 (amended 1909, 1963).
105 Id. art. XVIII, § 14.
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In the Constitution of 1908, the drafters again included a "public use"
requirement to protect private property. °6 The language of that constitution
restricted both corporations and the public from taking private property for "public
use, without the necessity therefor being first determined .... The current
Michigan Constitution also carries the "public use" restriction and echoes the Fifth
Amendment by plainly stating, "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation ... .""'8
Including the "public use" language in each of Michigan's successive
constitutions demonstrates a connection backward to the original Michigan
Constitution, which reflected both the Northwest Ordinance and the original
intention of the state's founders. The language in each of Michigan's constitutions,
being nearly identical to that of the Fifth Amendment and springing from the
Northwest Ordinance, is evidence of the common root of the protection provided
by the "public use" requirement.
IV. POLETOWN CONTRADICTED BOTH THE MICHIGAN FOUNDERS' AND THE
NATIONAL FOUNDERS' VIEW OF "PUBLIC USE"
One of the most notorious cases of the government using the "public benefit"
rationale to defeat the "public use" requirement, established by the Founders and
adopted by the states, °9 was Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit."
Using the modem "public benefit" rationale, the city of Detroit used its eminent
domain power to condemn a neighborhood and gave the land to General Motors to
build an assembly plant on the site. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the
public benefitted by transferring the land "to a private corporation to build a plant
to promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic
base of the municipality and state[.]""
The Poletown court refused to find a difference between the phrases "public
purpose" and "public use."' " "The majority mistakenly concluded that the terms
'public use' and 'public purpose' have 'been used interchangeably.""' 3 It should
be noted here that the Poletown court employed the rationale behind the "public
benefit" but used the words "public purpose," which further muddied the already
"0 Coincidentally 1909 was the same year in which Lewis's treatise was last revised.
107 MICH. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (amended 1963).
108 Id. at art. X, § 2.
109 See supra Part II-A.
l0 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
".. Id. at457.
112 Id. at 458.
113 BriefofNon-Party Inst. for Justice and Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol'y as Amicus Curiae
at 9, County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070-124078)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Inst. for Justice] (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457).
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murky waters because each of these phrases has its own genesis and applies to
different areas of the law. In an attempt to clear up the confusion in the Poletown
opinion, the Institute for Justice and Mackinac Center amicus brief in Hathcock
noted that
[t]he pre-Poletown precedents utilitizing the public purpose test
relate to taxation or other similar issues. In fact, the principal
precedent relied on by the Poletown majority to define the
concept of public purpose was a decision upholding the use of
tax revenue for the construction of a marina... [which] did not
in any way hold that the same standards applied to eminent
domain cases." 4
The amicus brief emphasized that the government's power to interfere "with the
individual in the case of taxation is wholly different from the case of eminent
domain."" 5 The eminent Michiganjurist Thomas Cooley had previously delineated
between eminent domain and the taxing/spending power:
The sovereign power of taxation is employed in a great many
cases where the power of eminent domain might be made more
immediately efficient and available, if constitutional principles
would suffer it to be resorted to; but each of these powers has its
own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which is
public for the demands of one is not necessarily of a character
to permit the exercise of another." 6
Poletown received instant scrutiny, and was condemned by many as the "poster
child for excessive condemnation. In reverse Robin Hood style, it appeared that
eminent domain was being used to displace modest homeowners in favor of a
powerful corporation.""' 7 Although Poletown was criticized by observers of all
political stripes, the decision did not surprise everyone. Indeed, "Poletown was just
the logical result of a line of decisions that put virtually no limit on the taking of
private property.""' 8
Justice Ryan, in his dissenting opinion, predicted that Poletown would have
disastrous results in Michigan's future eminent domain cases:
"4 Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 11 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 474 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
1.6 Amicus Brief for Institute for Justice, supra note 113, at 10 (quoting People ex rel.
Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 477-78 (1870)).
".. Ely, supra note 88, at 35.
118 Id.
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The reverberating clang of [Poletown's] economic, socio-
logical, political, and jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard
and felt for generations. By its decision, the Court has altered
the law of eminent domain in this state in a most significant way
and, in my view, seriously jeopardized the security of all private
property ownership. " 9
Reading the "public use" requirement out of the Constitution heightens the
likelihood of the abuse of power by our elected officials, who are encouraged by the
prevailing majority or whichever interests most effectively reach them, to ever more
blatant acts of constitutional recklessness. The quest for control of political power
can become the quest for a redistribution of land. 120
When government can take property to give it to private parties,
interest groups will try to commandeer that power to enrich
themselves .... Groups which hope to profit from forced
redistributions of property will attempt to influence the govern-
ment to use eminent domain in their favor. But, properly
applied, the public use limitation prevents this by making it
impossible for interest groups to profit.' 2 '
The danger of an unrestricted understanding of the Takings Clause is clear.
"[W]hen the public use limitation is eviscerated, the power to take private property
tends to fall into the hands of those who are already wealthy or popular to be used
against those who are not,"' 2 which is precisely the type of disregard for the
minority about which The Federalist No. 10 warns.
23
The natural inclination toward governmental abuse of power, recognized by our
Founders 24 was unleashed by the "public benefit" reasoning in cases such as
Poletown because "[a]ccording to this view.., whatever the lawmakers decide to
do satisfies the public use test."' 25 A Mississippi bureaucrat, speaking about a
recent case,' 26 in which the state of Mississippi sought to condemn twenty-three
"9 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
120 Cf Ely, supra note 88, at 31.
121 Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. and ACLU Fund of Mich. in Support of
Defendants-Appellants at 11, County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)
(Nos. 124070-124078) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Pac. Legal Found.].
122 Id. at 12.
123 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
124 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
.25 Ely, supra note 88, at 31.
126 Miss. Major Econ. Impact Auth. v. Archie, No. CO-2001-0082, slip op. 601 (Miss.
Special Ct. of Eminent Domain, filed July 26, 2001). See also John Kramer, Court Issues
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
acres of private land to add to the 1300 acres it was transferring to Nissan in order
to sweeten the deal, captured the alarming degree to which it has become second
nature for politicians to take private property without conceiving of a limit to their
ability to do so: 127
State Development Authority Executive Director James Bums,
Jr. admitted in the New York Times that the property was not
actually a part of the project: "It's not that Nissan is going to
leave if we don't get that land. What's important is the message
it would send to other companies if we are unable to do what we
said we would do. If you make a promise to a company like
Nissan, you have to be able to follow through.""12
Bums's comment illustrates the pervasiveness of a government mentality that
recognizes no limit on its power of eminent domain, save what it might deem to be
outside of the public's benefit, if indeed anything can be. Bums's preference for
keeping his "promise to a company like Nissan" 29 over the constitutional exercise
of the eminent domain power shows the danger of reading the "public use"
requirement broadly or without meaning. When "local officials insist that property
taken under eminent domain for economic development serves a public purpose"
and "point to the desirability of economic growth" to justify "the taking of private
property," the limit to their ambition falls from view. '30 Bums's comment anticipates
that the government will continue overreaching on behalf of "other companies." He
hardly paints this taking as one of special necessity or of extraordinary circumstance.
Poletown left Michigan's eminent domain jurisprudence in a condition that
Madison, Adams, and the drafters of Michigan's constitution would not recognize.
By removing the high threshold installed by the Founders, the Michigan Supreme
Court left private property owners, such as Ann Giannini, without an easily defined
protection for theirproperty and properly fearful of a government's limitless power.
Once the broad public benefit rationale, spelled out in Poletown, has been
adopted, the government's taking power appears unlimited. But a limit must be
reinstalled if the government is to act within the intended scope of the "public use"
requirement. The solution is to return modem jurisprudence to the Founders' view
of eminent domain and reinstall the restraints that Poletown and its brethren
Mixed Ruling in Mississippi Eminent Domain Case, Inst. for Justice (July 27, 2001), at
http://www.ij.org/private_property/mississippi/7-27_0 lpr.html.
127 See Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 598.
128 David Firestone, Black Families Resist Mississippi Land Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2001, at A20.
129 Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 598 (citation omitted).
130 Ely, supra note 88, at 31.
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removed. This revolution of restraint must occur in the courts, which have been
largely reluctant.
While many scholars have noted the injustice caused by the
broad reading of "public use," courts have only rarely put real
teeth in the review by enforcing the public use clause as a
substantive limit on government power. So long as the law
permits private redistributions of wealth on the grounds of
allegedly public gains, these injustices will continue.'
V. HATHCOCK RESTORES MEANING TO THE "PUBLIC USE" REQUIREMENT
Thankfully not all courts are oblivious to the original meaning of "public use."
The Michigan Supreme Court's 2004 Hathcock decision overruled Poletown and
stopped the dilution of the public use requirement by restoring its restrictive nature.
Hathcock replaced the broad public benefit rationale of Poletown with a narrow
definition of "public use" that resembles the Founders' definition.'32
The facts of the Hathcock case were similar to Poletown'33 But unlike in
Poletown, the Hathcock court held that the county had to abide by state constitu-
tional limits on its eminent domain power as the limits were understood during the
ratification of the current Michigan Constitution. Those limits, which the Hathcock
taking did not satisfy, 3 4 are set forth in the Michigan Constitution at article 10,
section 2, which establishes that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner
131 Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3, at 599 (citations omitted). See
also id. at 571 (noting that limitless eminent domain power most hurts the poor, whose land
is often taken for a large corporate purpose).
132 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786-87 (Mich. 2004).
l33 Wayne County, Michigan, moved to condemn nineteen parcels of land south of
Metropolitan Airport, just outside Detroit, in order to develop a technology park. Hathcock
was one of the owners of these parcels. The parcels were taken by eminent domain to make
contiguous the county's previous purchases of land, on which it intended to develop the
technology park. The county contended that the business park would create as many as
30,000 jobs and add $350 million to the tax base. The case rose to the Michigan Supreme
Court after the circuit court and the court of appeals both ruled that the exercise of eminent
domain fit the definition of "public use" established in Poletown and that there was nothing
wrong with the present taking. The Michigan Supreme Court then granted certiorari. See id.
at 770-72 (setting forth the facts more fully).
'3 Id. at 778 ("If the authority to condemn private property conferred by the Legislature
lacked any constitutional limits, this Court would be compelled to affirm the decisions of the
circuit court and the Court of Appeals. But our state Constitution does, in fact, limit the
state's power of eminent domain.").
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prescribed by law." '35 As has been discussed previously, 136 Michigan's constitu-
tional language is similar to the Fifth Amendment's language.'37
Hathcock's strength is in the manner in which the opinion was developed and
written. The court did not find that the county lacked the power to condemn private
property in all instances but observed that the government is forbidden from con-
demning the private property of one owner for the purpose of giving it to another
private owner if the condemnation was not "'necessary' to the [new] end[ ]"3' or
if it is not "for the use or benefit of the public," ' 9 as required by Michigan law.
Ultimately, the court found that the taking did not satisfy the state's public use
requirement. "'
A. Interpreting "Public Use" in Michigan
The county's condemnation in Hathcock failed the court's public use test. 41
In determining what constituted a "public use," the court used a "common under-
standing"' 42 interpretive methodology, also employing a "term of art" corollary.'43
As the court reasoned, "The primary objective in interpreting a constitutional
provision is to determine the text's original meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at
the time of ratification .... But if the constitution employs technical or legal terms
of art, 'we are to construe those words in their technical, legal sense."""1
44
The court found "that no one sophisticated in the law at the 1963 Constitution's
ratification would have understood 'public use' to permit the condemnation of
defendants' properties for the construction ofa business and technology park owned
by private entities.' 45 Justice Young observed that the term "public use" has
reappeared in each of the state's successive constitutions as a legal term of art and
a restriction on the state's eminent domain power.1 46 Looking further into the
history of "public use" as a term of art the court found that:
'3 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 2003).
136 See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
... U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation"); see also discussion supra Part IV-B.
138 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 776.
'39 Id. at 788 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 213.23 (West 1998)).
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788.
141 Id. at 781.
142 Id. at 780.
14 Id. at 779.
'44 Id. (quoting Silver Creek Drain Dist. v. Extrusions Div., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 436, 440
(Mich. 2003)).141 Id. at 784.
'" See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 780; see also supra notes 102-05 and accompanying
text.
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When our Constitution was ratified in 1963, it was well-
established in this Court's eminent domain jurisprudence that the
constitutional "public use" requirement was not an absolute bar
against the transfer of condemned property to private entities. It
was equally clear, however, that the constitutional "public use"
requirement worked to prohibit the state from transferring con-
demned property to private entities for a private use.'47
The court concluded that "public use" is a term of art with a deep and well-
defined history in Michigan, established by the fact that "this Court has weighed
in repeatedly on the meaning of this legal term of art."' 4 The full meaning of
"public use," as used in the Michigan constitution, can be uncovered "only by
delving into this body of case law, and thereby determining the 'common under-
standing' among those sophisticated in the law at the time of the Constitution's
ratification."'49 Examining the history further, the court found that the "requirement
worked to prohibit the state from transferring condemned property to private entities
for a private use."' 50 By prohibiting a transfer for a private use, but not a public
one, Hathcock follows the Founders' understanding of the restrictive nature of the
Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement."'
B. A General Economic Benefit Is Not a "Public Use"
Hathcock's rejection of Poletown's economic rationale in claiming a "public use"
makes unconstitutional the government's transfer of private land between private
owners with the intention of increasing economic output.15 2 "Before Poletown, [the
Michigan Supreme Court] had never held that a private entity's pursuit of profit was
a 'public use' for constitutional takings purposes simply because one entity's profit
maximization contributed to the health of the general economy."' 53 In fact, the court
makes a point to say that use of the eminent domain power to transfer land between
private parties for a private use was antithetical to the state constitution's "public
use" requirement. 154 By refusing to allow a transfer of private property to another
private interest with a proposed more efficient economic use, Michigan has made
"'7 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 780.
,49 Id. at 780-81.
So Id. at 781 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
'51 See supra Parts I and II.
152 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786.
153 Id.114 Id. at 78 1.
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sure that no longer can "a private entity's pursuit of profit... [be considered] a
'public use."155
Hathcock firmly rejected and overruled Poletown's economic rationale as having
"no support in the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence before the Constitution's
ratification,"' 56 and found further that "its interpretation of 'public use' in art. 10, § 2
[could not] reflect the common understanding of that phrase among those sophisti-
cated in the law at ratification."'] 57
C. Three Acceptable Cases for Making a Public Use Condemnation
Justice Young's majority opinion in Hathcock looked back to Justice Ryan's
dissent in Poletown and observed that "public use" transfers for private use are
justified only when they pass one of three tests: to be constitutional, the transfer of
property between private entities must fit the necessity requirement, maintain the
public accountability of the acquiring entity, or be based upon a public concern. 58
"[A]n individual sophisticated in the law at the time of ratification of [the] 1963
Constitution,[ ]would" have found only these three reasons acceptable for transfer
to another private entity. 59
The necessity requirement, as defined by Ryan's dissent in Poletown and
Young's majority in Hathcock, is a question of extreme necessity. 60 It requires
the "very existence" of the new public use to "depend[] on the use of land that
can be assembled only by the coordination central government alone is capable of
achieving.' 161 Justice Young went on to explain that the situation envisioned is one
"in which collective action is needed to acquire land for vital instrumentalities of
commerce," such as "railroads, gas lines, highways" and other actual uses which
can occur only on the land in question. 62 Hathcock's formulation of the "necessity"
requirement is in keeping with the narrow scope the Founders intended.163
The second acceptable condition for transferring property to another private
entity is "when the public retain[s] a measure of control over the property."'" 6
Justice Young again quoted Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent, explaining "[l]and
cannot be taken, under the exercise of the power of eminent domain, unless, after
"I Id. at 786.
156 Id. at 787.
157 id.
158 Id. at 781-83.
"9 Id. at 783.
'60 Id. at 781.
16' Id. (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
162 Id. at 782.
163 See supra notes 51, 59, 62, 66-67, 69, 76 and accompanying text.
'" Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
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it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the public, independent of the will of the
corporation taking it."165 In such a scenario the public's use is preserved by its
continued involvement with the private entity.
The final ground for an acceptable transfer of property to a private entity
requires that the impetus, and not the result, of the transfer be a public use. "[T]he
property must be selected on the basis of 'facts of independent public significance,'
meaning that the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, rather than the
subsequent use of condemned land, must satisfy the Constitution's public use
requirement. "166 The case the court discussed in connection with this test is a blight
removal case in which "[t]he city's controlling purpose in condemning the
properties was to remove unfit housing and thereby advance public health and
safety. 16
7
These three tests demonstrate an understanding of the Founders' intention of
the public use requirement serving a high threshold for abridging the people's right
to property. While not denying the government its eminent domain power, these
requirements ensure that such power is carefully and more rarely employed.
D. Hathcock Accords with the Original, Restrictive Meaning of "Public Use"
Hathcock accords with Madison's and Adams's understanding of the Fifth
Amendment's "public use" requirement by creating a high threshold for permitting
a government taking. 168 The Hathcock decision, like the Founders' understanding
of the Fifth Amendment, relied on a narrow, meaningful definition and interpreta-
tion of the "public use" requirement 69 which must be met to justify the taking of
private property. Hathcock leaves intact the government's power of eminent
domain to be used when a truly public use requires it, 7 ' but extinguishes justi-
fication on an economic benefit rationale, a rationale that the Founders would not
have recognized or accepted as legitimate for the transfer of land between private
owners.
171
165 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citing Berrien Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94 N.W. 379 (Mich.
1903))).
166 Id. at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
167 Id. (referring to In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951), cited in
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 455 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). See also Kelo v. New London, 125 S.
Ct. 2655, 2685 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing nuisance law in the common law
as being distinct from eminent domain).
168 See supra Part II.
169 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
170 See supra Part V-C.
171 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Hathcock stands in line with the understanding of "public use" which is
justified only in the presence of a public "exigency" or "necessity."' 72 It restores
the protections of private property that the Founders understood to exist from Locke
and the common law. Accordingly, Hathcock is in line with the early Supreme
Court's strong condemnation of"a law that takes property from A. and gives it to
B.' 73 for private purposes and its warning that "[t]he Legislature... cannot...
violate ... the right ofprivate property." 174
By restoring the restrictive nature of the "public use" requirement, Hathcock
has revitalized the plain meaning that John Lewis and the drafters of the 1909
Michigan Constitution understood the phrase to have as late as 1909.175 The
Supreme Court of Michigan has acted to further liberty 76 by protecting private
property from capricious government takings and quieting the "clang" begun by
Poletown. 177
VI. THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE - LOOKING FORWARD
America is in the midst of a national reawakening of "public use" jurisprudence.
"Where the public use clause was once thought to have been virtually rendered dead
letter, it has received increasing attention recently from legal scholars who have
pointed out that equating 'public benefit' with 'public use' gives the government
almost limitless power to redistribute property." 78 The already infamous Kelo'79 case
has accelerated the national awareness that government's abuse of the "public use"
requirement poses a serious threat to the quiet enjoyment of one's property. Kelo
has increased the attention focused on the judiciary's broadening "public use"
jurisprudence. Despite the disappointing Kelo decision, a heightened awareness of
the abuse of the eminent domain power is good news for current and future property
owners because the citizenry will more vigilantly watch for and more harshly object
to such abuses. 0
172 See supra notes 51, 59, 62, 66, 68, 76 and accompanying text.
' Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 388 (1798).
'74 Id. at 388.
175 See supra notes 75, 83 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 103-07 and
accompanying text (showing that Michigan adopted a new version of its constitution in 1909,
which maintained the "public use" language).
176 Cf Eagle, The Development of Property Rights, supra note 27, at 83.
177 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
178 Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective, supra note 3 at 593 (citations omitted). See
also discussion supra Part IV.
17' Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
180 See, e.g., Donald Lambro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2005, at AO 1 (reporting that 16 states have now introduced legislation to ban eminent domain
from being used to assist private developers).
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A. Successes in the States
Before Kelo was decided, cases around the country restricting the government's
eminent domain power had been making their way through the courts.'8 ' Hathcock
stands as one of these several cases in the last few years to take seriously the limits
that exist on governmental taking power. Hathcock's significance after Kelo only
grows as it provides a proper blueprint for other states examining the "public use"
requirement in their own constitutions.
Before the Supreme Court got it wrong in Kelo, state courts had been moving
in the right direction, narrowing the "public use" requirement by distinguishing it
from the term "public purpose." Wisconsin, 82 Illinois,'83 and South Carolina' all
took the view that "public purpose" is a requirement that attaches to the "just
compensation" requirement for takings. They found that "public purpose" simply
requires the government's expenditure to be for a public purpose, while the "public
use" is the limit on condemnation itself. 85
These states have correctly taken seriously and reattached the restrictive
meaning originally intended in the "public use" requirement. In so doing many of
these states have expressly rejected the public benefit rationale. In a passage
representative of others, the South Carolina Supreme Court did exactly that:
The public use implies possession, occupation, and enjoyment
of the land by the public at large or by public agencies; and the
due protection of the rights of private property will preclude the
government from seizing it ... and turning it over to another on
vague grounds of public benefit to spring from a more profitable
use to which the latter will devote it.186
In 2002 the Illinois Supreme Court flatly rejected Poletown's rationale as un-
persuasive.'87 Because "'every lawful business' "contribut[es] to positive economic
181 See generally Steven J. Eagle, Dramatic State Cases Largely Support Property Rights,
5 ENGAGE 49 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Eagle, State Cases] (reporting on Hathcock and many
other state cases). See also Amicus Brief for Inst. for Justice, supra note 113, at 4-7.
182 See Eagle, State Cases, supra note 181, at 52 (discussing Town ofBeloit v. County of
Rock, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 2003)).
183 See id. (discussing Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. 2003)).
" See id. at 52-53 (discussing Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d
853 (S.C. 2003)).
185 Id.
186 Georgia Dep 't of Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 856-57 (quoting Edens v. City of Columbia,
91 S.E.2d 280, 283 (S.C. 1956)).
'87 See Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.C.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002).
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growth[,]" the public use requirement was not met by "the economic by-products of
a private capitalist's ability to develop land."'88 The Illinois opinion went on to
distinguish the differences between "public purpose" and "public use" as being
more than "purely semantic [.] ... [Although] the line between the two terms has
blurred somewhat in recent years, a distinction still exists .... [The] flexibility [in
terminology] does not equate to unfettered ability to exercise takings beyond
constitutional boundaries."' 89 Thankfully a significant number of state supreme
courts have avoided the confusion of "public use" with "public benefit" or "public
purpose" and offer hope that they and other state courts, when interpreting "public
use" in their own constitutions, will reject Kelo's faulty interpretation in favor of
the original restrictive meaning of the requirement.
B. Problems in the States
While many state "public use" cases are being decided in favor of the original
understanding discussed in this Note, not all are. Recently the Supreme Court of
Nevada found a "public purpose" in condemning private lands for transfer to casino
owners to build a parking lot. 9 0 Here the court employed both the flawed "public
purpose" and general economic benefit rationales to justify the taking."'
But perhaps even before the United States Supreme Court affirmed it, the most
notorious of the recent state cases to use Poletown's economic rationale was Kelo
v. City of New London. 92 In a fact pattern very similar to Poletown, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut and the United States Supreme Court upheld the "public
purpose" of economic development and expansion of the tax base as a legitimate
"public taking" when private homes were taken to transfer the land to a private
developer.'93
.88 Id. at 9-10.
189 Id.
"9o City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003) (en
banc).
91 Id. at 5.
'9 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
193 As the state court stated,
"Public use" may therefore well mean public usefulness, utility or
advantage, or what is productive ofgeneral benefit; so that any appro-
priating of private property by the state under its right of eminent
domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking
for public use. Such, it is believed, is the construction which has
uniformly been put upon the language by courts, legislatures and legal
authorities.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 522 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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C. A National Misstep
The Supreme Court of Connecticut cited Poletown as persuasive authority.'94
While Poletown was persuasive authority for the Connecticut court's justification,
the court was disappointed to find the Poletown "majority... limited the impact of
its holding."' 95 Almost as if to make up for the restraint it believed the Michigan
court to have improperly shown in 1981, the Connecticut court, in 2004, saw no
reason to question the legislature's definition of "public use"- ever. 96 The United
States Supreme Court found no reason to exercise a heightened review of the
Connecticut legislature' 97 and wasjoined by Justice Kennedy's enthusiastic concur-
rence, which eagerly adopted the Court's rational basis review, rejecting a more
skeptical judicial review.' 98
The majority readily admitted that "many state courts in the mid-19th century
endorsed 'use by the public' as the proper definition of public use"'9 9 but then
observed that this reading of the words eroded over time.200 In recognizing this fact,
the Court confessed its disinterest in using the true, original meaning of the words
"public use" and displayed its fixation with continuing the erroneous precedent it
has developed and with upholding stare decisis. Justice Thomas rightly took the
Court to task for its disregard of the intent of those who put the words "public use"
in the Constitution.20' As if to prove Justice Thomas's point, the Court's opinion
continually substituted the words "public purpose" for "public use. 20 2
194 Id. at 528-31 & n.39.
'9' Id. at 529 n.39.
196 Id. (stating "that the application of a 'heightened scrutiny' standard is inconsistent with
our well established approach of deference to legislative determinations of public use")
(citation omitted).
'9' See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 ("The disadvantages of a heightened form of review are
especially pronounced in this type of case.").
191 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This case ... survives the meaningful rational
basis review that in my view is required under the Public Use Clause.").
199 Id. at 2662.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 2677-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Today's decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing
the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod
to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use Clause, originally
understood, is a meaningful limit on the government's eminent domain
power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause's original meaning, and
I would reconsider them.
Id. at 2678.
202 See id. at 2655-68 (majority opinion).
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D. Returning to the Path
In Kelo's wake, taking seriously the Founders' beliefs about the "public
use" requirement is more important than ever. As Justice Thomas's dissent
powerfully argued, understanding the Founders' purposeful use of the words in
the Constitution should be the starting place for understanding that document.
Thankfully, other judges agree with Justice Thomas, most notably those on the
Michigan Supreme Court who soberly considered the actual words of that state's
constitution in deciding a case similar to Kelo. Kelo's method of interpreting the
Constitution so as to read out of the text the actual meaning of its words. 3 is a
dangerous jurisprudence to employ. Justice Young's and Justice Thomas's consid-
eration of the actual words of our governing documents is encouraging. Justice
Thomas's opinion succinctly framed the Court's error in refusing to read the words
as they were originally intended and understood: "If the Public Use Clause served
no function other than to state that the government may take property through its
eminent domain power - for public or private uses - then it would be
surplusage."2"6 Because the Michigan court carefully examined the historical
meaning of the words "public use," it reached a result that holds true to the
plain and original meaning of those words; the minority in Kelo Would have
nationalized this result if only they could have persuaded another Justice to take
seriously the Constitution's original meaning. But as has been pointed out,2"5 the
majority felt that the passage of time and reliance upon earlier, erroneous precedent
was sufficient reason to disregard whatever meaning the words had when they were
first used in the Fifth Amendment.
In light of the Supreme Court's choice to ignore the original meaning of
"public use" and to make coequal the modem definition of "public purpose,"
Hathcock's strong rejection of the broad "public benefit/public purpose" or general
economic benefit rationale becomes even more significant. Hathcock must now
become a guide to other state courts along the path of return to an original
understanding of the "public use" requirement. Ironically, the United States
Supreme Court cited Hathcock as an example of the stricter state interpretation
that remains permissible after Kelo.2°6 If the original restrictions the Founders
203 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204 Id.
201 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
206 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed,
many States already impose "public use" requirements that are stricter
than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been
established as a matter of state constitutional law ....
Id. (citing County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)).
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intended for the eminent domain power are to be restored by the courts, other states
will have to follow the path that Hathcock has marked.
CONCLUSION
The Founders placed a premium on the ownership of private property.2 °7 In
fact, they believed government's chief purpose was to protect it.208 Because the
government was responsible for protecting the citizens in the enjoyment of their
property, the Founders restricted its power of eminent domain by applying two
straightforward restraints °.2 1 Chief among them was the "public use" requirement. 211
Only a plain reading gives "public use" a restrictive meaning that accords with the
Founders' expectation that government would secure the citizens in their property.
It therefore must be understood that the Founders required an actual public use for
a taking to be legitimate. t ' An unfettered power to take land would give the
legislature a power beyond what the citizens had possessed themselves in a state of
nature and would be inconsistent with the Founders' understanding of just
government.212 If the Founders had not intended to restrain the eminent domain
power, property could be taken at any time, for any reason, 213 which would be
antithetical to their belief that individuals can give the government no more power
than they possess in the state of nature and would contravene their intention to
protect individual's natural rights.21 4 Instead, the Founders relied upon the "public
use" requirement to restrict the eminent domain power and force takings to be
justified on the grounds that the taking was compelled for an actual, necessary
public use.
The Poletown and Kelo decisions brushed aside the Founders' restraint on the
Legislature and allowed a "public use" to be declared for the general public welfare
based on the economic benefit rationale.2 5 The cities involved postulated that the
mere possibility of an economic benefit for the general community was sound
reasoning upon which private homes and businesses should be taken. Poletown
helped to continue a nationwide wave in which state and federal takings were
justified through a broad economic public benefit rationale rather than through
207 See supra Part I-A.
208 See supra Part I-B.
209 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20 See supra Part II-A.
211 See supra Part II-B.
212 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 74, 79, 96 and accompanying text.
214 See supra Part I-B.
211 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667-69 (2005); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981).
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the traditional, restrictive "public use" rationale; Kelo is merely the federal
culmination of this rationale.
As a result of the rationale used in Poletown, private land owners saw their
property taken and given to other private land owners who, the courts said, were
better qualified to own it because they would better serve the public welfare by
undertaking a more productive economic use.2 6 Under the economic benefit
rationale families - such as Ann Giannini's - have been displaced, businesses
closed, and properties bulldozed to make way for uses deemed to be more
economically desirable. The Supreme Court's holding in Kelo has made the general
public acutely aware of the danger posed to their own property by a government
using this rationale.
The public's bewildered and frustrated reaction to Kelo indicates a growing
interest in property rights, and specifically the "public use" requirement.217 Already
democratic initiatives to protect private property are making their way through the
states, and legislators on both sides of the aisle have reacted to the outrage and fear
of their constituents by introducing palliative legislation. 8 These are laudable
reactions to Kelo, but they are unnecessary. Justice Thomas's Kelo dissent and
Justice Young's Hathcock opinion show that the safeguards against government
overstepping its eminent domain power already exist in the "public use" require-
ment and that no more government action is needed than to interpret this require-
ment as it was originally intended."1 9 These newly signed laws will soon go the way
of the Fifth Amendment's "public use" clause if our courts insist on ignoring the
plain meaning of the words that restrict the eminent domain power.
In Michigan, Hathcock has stopped the unconstitutional expansion of the
"public use" requirement. By relying on a proper, narrow definition of "public
use" to reject Wayne County's attempt to prefer one private owner's use over that
of another, Hathcock recreates Michigan's original, restrictive and constitutional
"public use" jurisprudence. If other states are serious about protecting private
property under their own constitutions, they will do well to follow Michigan's lead
and interpret their own Public Use Clauses as the strict requirements they were
originally intended to be. Unfortunately for Ann Giannini, Michigan's return to
originalism came twenty-four years too late.
216 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 88, at 34-35.
217 See, e.g., Mary Deibel, Ruling Doesn 't End Property Rights Clash, DET. NEWS, Aug.
1,2005, available at: http://www.detnews.com/2005/nation/0508/01/A06-265208.htm (last
visited Aug. 29, 2005).
218 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
219 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting); County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765, 765 (Mich. 2004).
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